A RFID group scanning protocol enables a RFID reader to produce a proof of co-existence of multiple RFID tags. This type of protocol is also referred to as yoking-proof, grouping-proof and co-existence proof. In this letter, we show that all of the previous group scanning protocols are vulnerable to relay attack.
Introduction
Juels introduced the concept of RFID group scanning by presenting a protocol called yoking-proof [1] . The protocol enables a reader to produce a proof of co-existence of two tags within its communication range. Unfortunately, yoking-proof is vulnerable to replay attack [2] . The improved versions were presented in [2] - [5] to resist against replay attack. In this letter, we present a universal relay attack on all RFID group scanning protocols in [1] - [5] . Our attack is practical in a sense that an attacker only needs to relay messages between a reader and a genuine. As a result of our attack, the reader produces a valid co-existence proof but containing a tag that is not supposed to be scanned.
Relay Attacks on Group Scanning Protocols
Throughout this letter, we will use notations summarized in Table 1 .
We first describe our attacking model as follows: the attacker acts as a proxy between a reader and a genuine tag which is out of the communication range of the reader. The attacker then relays messages exchanged between the reader and the victim tag so that the resulting co-existence proof contains the victim tag. Our attack is sometimes referred to as mafia fraud attack. The attacking model is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
We now briefly review RFID group scanning protocols in [3] - [5] and present our relay attacks on those protocols.
Relay Attack on Piramuthu's Protocol
Piramuthu's protocol [3] is an improved version of yokingproof which addresses vulnerability of the timestamp-based yoking-proof proposed in [2] . The protocol proceeds as P1. R → T 1 : r chosen at random. P2. T 1 → R: T 1 , r 1 chosen at random. P3. R → T 2 : r, r 1 . P4. T 2 → R: T 2 , r 2 and m 2 where r 2 is randomly chosen and
Our attack works as follows: the attacker renders itself as the tag T 2 , which is out of the communication range of the reader, in the above protocol. The attacker starts to intervene in step P3 as follows: [4] . The main idea of Lin et al.'s protocol is to encrypt the timestamp before sending to the reader so that attackers cannot collect MAC on different timestamp values from tags. Our attack on their first protocol is presented here but it is also applicable to the second one. The first protocol in [4] proceeds as follows:
Our attack on Lin et al.'s protocol involves relaying messages in steps L4 and L5 as follows:
Note that, Lin et al.'s protocols use timestamp to verify a proof. However, as we can assume that the processing time of the attacker is much faster than that of a tag, the lifespan of the protocols under attack can still be correctly verified.
Relay Attack on Burmester et al.'s Protocol
Burmester et al. also proposed two protocols for RFID group scanning, one with and one without tag anonymity [5] . The authors assume the two tags in a group share a common group id gid and a common secret key K g . The protocol without tag anonymity is described below. B9. R → V: P = (r, gid, c, r 1 , t 1 , r 2 , t 2 ).
Our attack on the above protocol can be executed in the same fashion as before. The attacker intervenes in the steps B1, B2, B3, B5 and B6 to relay the corresponding messages between the reader and the tag T 2 . Note that, the attacker needs to know two tags having the same group id beforehand. However, tags that have a common group id tend to be physically close to each other. In addition, it is trivial to collect group ids of tags. Therefore, our relay attack is still effective on Burmester et al.'s protocols.
Relay Attack versus Replay Attack
We compare relay attack and replay attack as follows:
• Relay attack is about faking a proof with forged tag location whereas replay attack can be about both forged location and time. It is because the relay attacker has to communicate with a victim tag and a reader whenever he wishes to create a forged proof. It is not the case for the replay attacker who reuses information obtained in previous sessions to create a forged.
• The relay attacker does not actively modify any message when communicating with tags and readers. On the other hand, the replay attacker may need to make adaptive queries to legitimate tags and readers in order to obtain information that is required to forge a proof.
Countermeasure and Conclusion
In order to prevent relay attack, we should prevent tag location from being forged. One can use a so called distancebounding protocol to verify the tag location by measuring time taken by one querying session. We can implement a distance-bounding protocol for a grouping-proof protocol as follows:
• R: Start clock.
• R ↔ T i : Query the tag T i .
• R: Stop clock; Include T i in the proof only if T i 's response is received within a pre-defined amount of time.
In conclusion, we have presented a universal relay attack on current grouping-proof protocols and one countermeasure. We think that it is important to address relay attack when defining a security notion for a secure grouping-proof protocol. Otherwise, security proof cannot be achieved.
